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Abstract 
This paper presents a proposed extension to the object oriented paradigm, whereby software 
objects are not only responsible for the encapsulation of data, but are also aware of the 
sensitivity of that data.  Those software objects which encapsulate sensitive information will 
actively defend both their sensitive data and their functionality.  These self-defending 
objects use object level role based access control to secure those sensitive resources.  
Applying access control measures within self-defending objects will not only ensure that 
access controls are appropriate and non bypassable, but will also simplify the development 
of security aware applications.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The development of trustworthy security aware applications has become increasingly 
important as business adopts web services as a means of conducting business over the 
internet.  We propose an extension to the object oriented programming paradigm which 
aides the development of security aware applications.  Using that approach, those software 
objects which encapsulate sensitive data are not only responsible for the maintaining the 
integrity of that data but also its protection from unauthorised access.  Because they actively 
defend their resources, such objects are referred to as self-defending objects (SDOs).  The 
adoption of this approach is expected to significantly enhance the effectiveness of a security 
aware application in maintaining both the integrity and confidentiality of their sensitive 
resources when subjected to malicious attack.  Logically, these SDOs provide the same 
functionality as an operating system providing mandatory access control, though at a much 
finer level of granularity.  
The remainder of this paper will: identify the need for a programming paradigm change to 
support the development of security aware applications, discuss concepts and recent 
research which relate to the concept of SDOs and describes the SDO architecture.  The 
paper concludes by outlining future work to further develop the SDO concept. 
SDOS - THE LOGICAL EXTENSION TO SOFTWARE OBJECTS 
With the widespread adoption of C++, Java and .Net, the object oriented (OO) paradigm has 
become the dominant programming paradigm for the development of application programs.  
By using objects to encapsulate data and restricting the interaction between objects to 
message passing, ensures that one part of an application does not depend on the 
implementation details of other parts and so simplifies the maintenance of data integrity.   
The OO paradigm represents the latest stage in the evolution of approaches to 3GL 
programming from structured programming through the use of abstract data types (ADTs) to 
current programming practices based on the use of object oriented programming and 
software component technology.  Each approach provided an increase in the level of 
abstraction and degree of data encapsulation available to application programmers. 
Applications which manage sensitive information have additional requirements including 
the restriction of access to sensitive information or security sensitive functionality and 
preserving the integrity of its own code.  During the evolution of computer languages and 
programming paradigms, the provision of support for maintaining the confidentiality and 
integrity of information has been neglected.  Certainly, each approach provided increased 
support for the maintenance of data integrity against software errors, but not malicious 
attacks.  Much of this improvement has been achieved through the localisation of all code 
which is able to directly access data.  That approach has also enabled more effective testing 
and correction of programming errors. 
Currently most security aware applications authenticate the user and thereafter mediate their 
access to sensitive information on the basis of that identity and the applications security 
policy.  Unfortunately, the code which enforces that control is not localized.  Instead 
security checks are made from wherever in the code is deemed appropriate, i.e. from 
effectively anywhere within the application. Consequently the possibility of making an 
inappropriate security check, or not performing one at all, is unacceptably high.  It is 
apparent that what is required is an approach similar to that employed to preserve data 
integrity.  Responsibility should be localized within the software object. Such objects will 
actively defend their encapsulated resources so they are referred to as being self defending. 
A self defending object (SDO) is a software object which, in addition to its current role of 
preventing corruption of its encapsulated data, is also responsible for: (1) maintaining the 
confidentiality of that data i.e. preventing unauthorized disclosure, (2) the protection of that 
data from unauthorized modification and (3) the protection of its security sensitive 
functionality from unauthorised use.  In contrast to the usual practice whereby a software 
object will always supply requested information or perform the requested operation, the 
action taken by a SDO will depend on the user on whose behalf the request was made (and 
the security policy).  No longer will the same message sent to an object necessarily result in 
the same response.  The response will depend on the origin of the request.  The SDO will 
defend its sensitive data and functionality by enforcing mandatory access control on its 
protected resources.  For example, a self defending medical record object will only provide 
details of the patients’ medical history if the request was made on behalf of the doctor 
currently caring for that patient.  It will not provide that information to any doctor who has 
access to the system. 
The use of SDOs will also ensure that the requirements of the security policy are non by-
passable.  A software object after all, provides the only mechanism by which its 
encapsulated information can be accessed from within the application.  (The protection of 
persistent forms of that information is delegated to the underlying trusted operating system 
or equivalent structures.)  Thus, the only access point for a particular piece of data is also 
where access controls are applied. 
The concentration of the security measures in an SDO parallels the approach taken within 
trusted operating systems whereby critical security related functionality is concentrated 
within the OS kernel.  Such localisation simplifies and underlies the establishment of trust.  
Similarly, the adoption of the SDO concept is expected to not only simplify the construction 
of security aware applications, but also raise the level of trust in those systems. 
The adoption of the web services model to enable business to business integration has 
greatly increased the need for trusted security aware applications.  Security flaws in a web 
services server are particularly serious as critical business systems are exposed to attack 
from the security hostile internet.  Current application development techniques may not be 
sufficient to provide the increased level of trust required of a web services server.  The 
evolution of programming paradigms, beyond the object oriented paradigm to include the 
concept of SDOs, is required to help meet the need of application developers who must 
deliver trusted web services servers. 
RELATED CONCEPTS 
Currently no work has been conducted which directly employs to the SDO concept.  There 
are several areas of information security research which parallel the SDO approach in that 
components of a system take responsibility for their own security. This section begins with a 
review of two such research areas: self securing devices and self protecting objects.  It 
continues with reviews of object oriented programming, role based access control, relevant 
aspects of computer security and finally the use of web services. 
Self securing devices 
Self securing devices, is an approach to securing computer systems in which hardware 
devices take responsibility for their own protection, i.e. the devices are self securing. 
(Ganger et al., 2001)  The argument developed to support their proposal involves drawing 
an analogy between the evolution in defence strategies in ancient times and the defence 
strategies used to secure computer systems.  They argue that the security mechanisms 
employed in modern computer systems parallels the approach taken to securing towns in 
Roman times, when defence relied on the provision of a wall to secure the perimeter. Once 
breached, the invaders effectively gain access to everything inside that perimeter.  Similarly, 
Ganger et al. (2001) argues that “conventional security architectures are brittle by design, 
because a small number of border protections (e.g. firewalls and/or host OSs) are used to 
protect a large number of resources and services.  For example, an attacker who 
compromises a machine's OS gains control over all resources of that machine”.   
Over time the ancient defence strategies evolved in response to more sophisticated attacks. 
By medieval times, multi-tiered defence structures were employed.  They argued that a 
similar change is needed to secure computer systems.  The current perimeter approach to 
security should be supplemented by the provision of internal defended boundaries.  Ganger 
et al. (2001) describes their approach as “This “self-securing devices” architecture 
distributes security functionality amongst physically distinct components, avoiding much of 
the fragility and unmanageability inherent in today's border-based security”.   
Due to the similarity of the concepts of self-securing devices and SDOs, the argument 
applies equally well to the need to apply the SDO concept to the development of security 
aware applications.  Also the effectiveness of providing localised protection within self 
securing devices supports our belief that the SDO concept will prove to be a valuable 
extension to the object oriented programming paradigm. 
Self protecting objects in object oriented databases 
The term “self protecting objects” has been employed in the context of federated object 
oriented databases.  Olivier (1996b, 1996a)describes the mechanism by which the use of self 
protecting objects ensures that all policies relating to a particular object are enforced as the 
object is migrated within the federated database.  The security architecture relies on the 
presence of a Trusted Common Core (TCC) within all member databases.  The TCC is 
responsible for providing basic protection measures including assurance that any the 
specific protection measures associated with a particular object are enforced.  An optional 
Trusted Extension (TE) may be present at a site to provide additional site specific protection 
for its objects.  If an object is migrated, the TE migrates with that object.  The TCC ensures 
that the TE associated with the object will always be executed, so access to the information 
within the migrated object will always be in accordance with the security requirements of 
the site from which it originated. 
Olivier et al. (1992) also introduced the concept of baggage: “baggage is collected from all 
the components involved in any request; this baggage may be verified by the object against 
its personal security profile before any method is executed”.  This mechanism permits the 
evaluation of requirements such as “method X can be invoked only in response to a message 
if that message was transmitted over secure channels”.  The baggage associated with the 
message, includes amongst other accumulated information, the necessary transmission 
channel details. 
Although self-protecting objects are restricted to object oriented databases, while self 
defending objects are used in the context of application development, the realization of 
federated object oriented databases based on the concept of self-protecting objects, supports 
our belief that SDOs will also prove useful.  The concept of accumulated baggage may also 
provide insight into how trust in messages exchanged between SDOs may be maintained in 
a distributed application.   
The need for trusted operating systems 
As noted by Loscocco et al. (1998), “Current security efforts suffer from the flawed 
assumption that adequate security can be provided in applications with the existing security 
mechanisms of mainstream operating systems”.  They continue by arguing that such an 
approach “can only result in a “fortress built upon sand””, hence the review of the 
fundamentals of OS security later in this section.  As suggested by Loscocco, it is 
impossible to construct an application, including one relying on SDOs, which will be able to 
secure information unless the underlying operating system is secure.  The SDO prototypes 
developed as part of this research project will execute on a trusted operating system 
platform, such as Trusted Solaris. 
The Concept of Trust 
When timesharing computers were first introduced, there was great concern about the 
security of these systems as many were used for military purposes.  In the military model, 
information was ranked according to sensitivity and divided into compartments according to 
subject matter.  Users were given clearances which enabled the user to access information 
with a given sensitivity and topic (Pfleeger, 1989.).  A significant development in the 
management of such systems was the Bell LaPadula model (Bell et al., 1973) which 
described a mechanism by which classified documents could be handled in a secure 
computing system.  Pfleeger (1989.) described that model as being “a formal description of 
the allowable paths of information flow in a secure system”.  That model together with the 
Biba and Clark-Wilson models, define the basis of trust in computer systems.  The Biba 
model (Biba, 1977) is concerned with the appropriate modification of data, namely: a 
subject cannot modify an object with a higher integrity level and an object cannot be used 
by a subject to generate another object of higher integrity.  The Clark-Wilson model (Clark 
et al., 1987) deals with maintenance of data integrity by (1) requiring that subjects can only 
access object through programs and (2) require separation of duty which ensures that 
authorised subjects are unable to make inappropriate changes.   
At about this time, a major attempt to quantify the security measures needed to secure a 
computer system was undertaken by the U.S. Department of Defence.  The set of standards, 
the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), provided criteria for evaluating 
not only the functionality provided by the OS to secure a computer system, but also 
evaluated the level of trust that the functionality has been correctly implemented (DOD, 
1985).  Consequently the rating obtained for a system, related directly to the strength of the 
system to withstand an attack.  A key functional requirement of a secure operating system 
identified in that standard was the provision of mandatory access control (MAC).   
The TCSEC effectively provided an implementation model for the construction of secure 
computer systems by specifying the six fundamental requirements:  
•         SECURITY POLICY - There must be an explicit and well defined security policy 
enforced by the system 
•         MARKING - Access control labels must be associated with objects. 
•         IDENTIFICATION - Individual subjects must be identified. 
•         ACCOUNTABILITY - Audit information must be selectively kept and protected … 
•         ASSURANCE – The computer system must contain hardware/software mechanisms 
that can be independently evaluated … 
•         CONTINUOUS PROTECTION – The trusted mechanisms that enforce these basic 
requirements must be continuously protected 
…                                                                                                                                    
                                (DOD, 1985) 
A major criticism of TCSEC is that it bundled functional and assurance requirements.  As 
the criteria were developed to evaluate level of security provided by computing systems for 
essentially governmental use, it was of little surprise that security models more applicable to 
commercial use were not supported. 
TCSEC, together with several national standards which emerged later, were superseded by 
the international standard, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security 
Evaluation (CC 2.1) (CCPSO, 1999).  The CC provides a mechanism by which security 
requirements may be captured, together with a certification mechanism that allows the 
claims made by a product developer to be evaluated by a trusted third party.  These 
mechanisms potentially combine to provide a mechanism by which the purchaser of a 
security related product can have confidence that a procured product will meet their security 
requirements, not just those of the military.  
The significance of considering the need to establish trust in a security product or system, is 
that security aware applications should be evaluated against similar criteria.  Not only 
should the application provide security related functionality, but evidence should also be 
provided that it can be trusted to correctly perform that functionality.  A significant 
component in establishing that trust is the design methodology used.  A design based on the 
SDO concept will not only simplify the design of a security aware application, but also 
simplify program testing and code inspections.  One would expect that a greater level of 
trust in an applications’ security measures is established when the implementation is based 
on the SDO approach rather than on more ad hoc approaches.   
Mandatory and Role Based Access Control 
A SDO will conceptually provide the same protection to its encapsulated data and 
functionality as a secure operating system applies to its protected resources.   Access 
control, the controlling of the access of subjects (users) to objects (resources), is divided into 
two categories: discretionary and mandatory.  When discretionary access control is 
employed, as in a typical UNIX system, the control of access to the resources owned by a 
user is left to the discretion of that user. (Pfleeger, 1989.)  However in a commercial, and 
more so in a military setting, the generator of information is not the owner of that 
information, so organizational policies should dictate access to the resource.   
As described by Loscocco et al. (2001), the function of a mandatory access control (MAC) 
system is to “enforce a administratively set policy over all subjects and objects in a system, 
basing decisions on labels containing a variety of security-relevant information”.  MAC 
mechanisms ensure that security depends on the security requirements of the data, not on the 
discretion of users.  A major problem with classic MAC approach is the cost and complexity 
of the administration of such systems e.g. when a new user is given access to the system, all 
the numerous privileges needed by that user must be incorporated into the security policy. 
To overcome the problems with MAC administration, Ferraiolo (1992) proposed a different 
form of MAC, one based on the roles which users perform within the organisation.  In a role 
based access control (RBAC) system, rather than directly associating users with access to 
resources, users are associated with roles, and roles are associated with access to resources.  
When using RBAC, a new user gains the rights and permissions needed to operate within 
the system by simply being associated with one or more roles.   
In recent years, little emphasis has been placed on the provision of MAC and trusted 
operating systems in general.  However, the National Security Agency has been conducting 
research into the feasibility of adding RBAC functionality to an existing operating system.  
They developed and provide a patch to the Linux kernel, which transforms standard Linux 
into, Security Enhanced Linux (SE Linux) (NSA, 2003).  Sun Microsystems is also 
promoting Trusted Solaris, which similarly provides RBAC support, to commercial users 
developing trusted applications. 
Middleware provides RBAC functionality 
Currently fine grained access control decisions are typically made within application 
programs.  Beznosov et al. (1999) suggest that “There are two main reasons for application-
level access control, namely the necessity in fine-grained access control and the need for 
authorization decisions based on factors known only to the application.”  Most applications 
access their information resources by making calls on the API associated with the particular 
type of resource e.g. the OS file API for file access.  Whether the user of the application 
should be permitted to access a particular resource is determined at potentially numerous 
places within the application code.   
Barkley (1995) argued that the flexibility afforded by RBAC enables it to be applied within 
applications.  He proposed the removal of the access control logic from the application and 
moving that functionality to a middleware layer, which mediates the interaction between the 
application and the information resource.   
In such a system, the application ignores the need to restrict access to information and 
attempts to access the information by invoking the appropriate method in the API.  The API 
method however, does not access the information resource, but instead makes the 
corresponding call on a role object.  (A role class exists for each role and encapsulates the 
security policy for that role.)  The role object is responsible for determining which resources 
a user acting in that role is permitted to access and the form of that access.  If the requested 
access is permitted, the corresponding method call is invoked on the object maintaining the 
information resource.  An advantage of this approach is that a change in the privileges 
associated with a role, does not require a corresponding modification to the application 
program, instead only the (potentially automatically generated) role class requires updating.   
This model illustrates that the separation of application logic from authorization logic can be 
achieved while still applying fine grained application specific authorization.  Systems based 
on the use of SDOs will also achieve the same separation of logic by delegating the 
responsibility for access control to the individual SDOs.  As Barkleys’ model suggests, it 
might be prudent to further separate the authorization logic from the data manipulation logic 
by partitioning the SDO. The authorization logic could be encapsulated within a separate 
authorization object intimately associated with the SDO.  The use of separate authorization 
objects should simplify the updating of the relevant SDO policies in response to updates to 
the application wide security policy. 
Web Services 
The need for trusted security aware applications has been highlighted with the adoption of 
the web services model for constructing distributed computing systems. The SDO paradigm 
is aimed at partially addressing this need.  To demonstrate why the adoption of the web 
services model has increased security concerns, a brief introduction to web services follows. 
Extensible markup language (XML) is a general purpose markup language which allows the 
structural description of data.  These data descriptions are text based, so they provide a 
mechanism by which arbitrarily complex data may be transferred between applications 
running on different platforms.  XML messaging can also be used to provide a remote 
procedure call semantics.  This permits web servers and their clients to communicate by 
exchanging XML messages which are typically based to the WC3 Simple Object Access 
Protocol (SOAP).  Loosely coupled distributed applications can be constructed using 
multiple XML web servers belonging to various entities working together over the web.  A 
web service might provide simple functionality that is of general appeal, or alternatively it 
might expose a significant proportion of a business information system to business partners, 
enabling business to business integration of computer systems. 
The current SOAP standard completely ignores security issues relying on the assumed 
HTTP transport protocol to provide the necessary level of security (Endtrust, 2001).  
However, web services, without security enhancements, are known to be insecure.  IBM et 
al.(2002) acknowledged this problem as “our customers, industry analysts, and the press 
identify a key area that needs to be addressed as Web services become more mainstream: 
security.”  Submissions have been made to extend relevant standards to address this problem 
, including WS-Security (Atkinson et al., 2002).  IBM et al. (2002, Kreger, 2001) in 
supporting that proposal, claims that the WS-Security extensions to SOAP enables the 
exchange of confidential, authenticated and unmodified SOAP messages.  However such 
enhancements may not be sufficient to secure critical business systems.  These efforts only 
attempt to secure the communications channel (including the passing of user credentials) 
between the consumer of the web service and its provider.  Unfortunately these measures do 
not attempt to address the increased level of trust placed on the web services server to 
function correctly. 
The security of the application must be a major design concern when developing such server 
software.  A programming error which results in a vulnerability in the web services server is 
a significantly greater problem than the same vulnerability in another distributed 
application.  A web server is exposed to the security hostile web environment and 
potentially makes available descriptions of its functionality and methods of access publicly 
available.  The SDO paradigm is expected to help support the development of trustworthy 
web services servers.   
Object oriented language support for Security – Java 
Work is underway to use the Java programming language to develop a number of security 
aware applications based on the SDO concept.  These applications will hopefully provide 
proof of concept of the SDO approach.  In this section, the suitability of the Java language 
for developing these prototypes, as well as security aware applications in general, will be 
discussed. 
Security was a major design goal of the Java programming language and execution 
environment.  Applets are a particular concern as they download along with a web page, 
usually from an untrusted site and possibly without the knowledge of the recipient.  
Consequently, the Java language and the Java virtual machine restrict the actions that Java 
applications, and particularly applets, can perform.  
The Java language incorporates features that promote the production of robust systems, 
namely, strong typing, extensive run-time checking and automatic garbage collection.  The 
absence of such features in older programming languages such a C, has often been exploited 
by hackers to attack computer systems and application programs (Howard et al., 2002). 
When Java code is running, the security manager ensures that all restrictions placed on 
classes by the local system are enforced whether the code forms part of an application or an 
applet.  The security policy grants permissions to running code which enables it to access to 
what the security manager considers to be sensitive resources.  A permission may be granted 
on the basis of the location from which the class was loaded or the presence of a specified 
digital signature. 
Java, by default, does not provide a means of providing application level access control 
based on who is running the application.  The Java Authentication and Authorization 
Service (JAAS) Framework was introduced to overcome this deficiency.  Sun (2000) 
describes the extensions made by JAAS as “the Java 2 security architecture requires 
addition support for authentication (determining who is actually running the code) and 
extensions to the existing authorisation components to enforce new access controls based on 
who was authenticated.  The JAAS framework augments the Java 2 platform with this 
support.” 
The SDO and JAAS approaches to security aware application development are similar in 
that both aim to provide mandatory access control based on who is running the application.  
They differ in that JAAS provides a support architecture for developers.  The SDO concept 
on the other hand, describes how the access control within security aware applications 
should be implemented.  Thus the SDO concept provides guidance into how the JAAS 
mechanisms, or indeed other mechanisms, might be used to develop security aware 
applications. 
The proposed architecture for developing security aware applications using the SDO 
concept is presented next. 
ARCHITECTURE FOR SELF DEFENDING OBJECTS 
The incorporation of the SDO concept into the OO paradigm involves a shift in the way in 
which application developers look at objects.  Currently there is no notion of an object 
restricting access to its encapsulated data.  (When the SDO concept is used, those objects 
which provide either security sensitive functionality or encapsulate security sensitive 
information will mediate access to those resources.)  The identification of which objects 
should be self defending will be apparent early in the design process as restrictions on the 
provision of functionality and data will be specified in the security requirements for the 
application.  Objects which do not encapsulate sensitive information or perform security 
related functionality, will not be SDOs. 
An SDO will apply mandatory access control on its protected content and functionality. In 
an attempt to reduce the administrative overhead involved in the maintenance of the security 
policy and the potentially huge number of authorisations required, it is anticipated that role 
based access control will need to be employed.  As one might expect, some form of 
credential will need to be presented to a SDO, to facilitate this mediation.  Such mediation is 
achieved by controlling access to: 
•         the object constructor which enables the instantiation (creation) of the SDO: in a 
particular security context, the ability to instantiate a particular SDO may expose the 
system to a potential security breach.  In such cases, instantiation of these SDOs 
must be restricted to authorised users. 
•         accessor and mutator method calls: the preamble of those methods which access 
data members of the object will contain checks which ensure that user is authorised 
to call that method 
•         sensitive data members: all data members within a SDO will be declared as being 
private.  Consequently, access can only be gained through method calls.  When a 
method accesses multiple data members, not only will the ability to call that method 
be checked but also additional authorisation checks will be performed before access 
is made to each of the sensitive data members.  Should an access authorisation fail, 
the SDO should take the appropriate application specific action such as raising an 
exception or possibly providing a subset of requested information. 
•         other sensitive methods: access to those methods which do not access sensitive data 
members but still perform sensitive operations are also protected by the inclusion of 
checks in the method preamble. 
An additional benefit of using the SDO approach is the separation of application and 
authorisation logic.  The first level of localisation is achieved by moving all authorisation 
logic from the main application as a whole to the SDOs.  A second level of localisation can 
be achieved if the SDO contains a dedicated authorisation object into which all of the 
authorisation logic is moved.  That authorisation object should obviously be private to the 
SDO, and encapsulate only that portion of the applications’ security policy which relates to 
its associated SDO.  Logically, the authorisation object need only provide two methods: one 
determines whether the provided credential entitles the user to invoke the specified method 
of the SDO, while the other determines whether that user may access the specified data field 
of the SDO in the requested manner.  The use of a separate authorization object has the 
advantage that it allows an arbitrarily complex set of access rules to be applied without 
increasing the complexity of the SDO code. 
The creation of a separate authorisation object also simplifies the updating of the 
authorisation logic in response to changes to the applications security policy.  A number of 
mechanisms could be employed to implement the required authentication object.  By way of 
example, one of the simplest approaches would be to write a single authorisation class. 
When instantiating an authentication object, the constructor is passed the name of the class 
to which its SDO belongs.  This enables the loading of only the relevant authorisation 
information from the applications' policy file or database.  Subsequent authorisation 
decisions requested by its associated SDO are based on that, now static, policy information.  
Such a simple approach is only applicable to short-lived non-distributed applications.   
When application development is being performed in a Java environment, in simple 
situations such as that just described, the same functionality can be realised by using JAAS 
authorization.  Then, the ability of a user to invoke a method or access a sensitive data 
member can be determined purely on the basis of the possession of a privilege.  Instead of 
using a separate authorization object, calls to the security manager (or access control 
context) can be used to determine whether the required privilege is held, and hence whether 
the operation should be permitted. 
The number of application specific privileges required to initialize an application based on 
SDOs is significant.  The required privileges include those needed to  (1) instantiate each of 
the SDOs which are present in the initialised system, and  (2) invoke those SDO methods 
which are needed to raise the system into a consistent initial state.  A separate role needs to 
be defined for that purpose as the privileges are different from and more extensive than 
those which a normal user of the application would possess.  An automatic logout from that 
role is required immediately after system initialisation.  
We believe that using the SDO approach when developing security aware applications will 
provide very fine grained access control which is both complete and not able to be bypassed 
from within the application itself.  Little protection will be provided if the sensitive 
information can be accessed by means other than the application.  If attacks against 
persistent copies of the sensitive information protected by the application (i.e. the databases 
or data files) are possible, any the security provided by the application is negated.  An attack 
might also take the form of modification to the policy, authorisation or authentication files 
on which the applications’ security measures rely.  Although cryptographic techniques may 
prove useful in providing confidentiality or permitting the detection of modification of such 
resources, only the MAC services provided by a trusted OS can protect these systems.   
A significant part of securing a computer system or application involves the generation of 
complete audit information.  SDOs also perform the primary role in the provision of this 
function.  To establish a complete audit trail, all occurrences of tracked operations must be 
recorded i.e. the audit process must not be able to be bypassed.  As all these tracked 
operations will be performed by an SDO, the SDOs should be primarily responsible for the 
creation of the audit trail.  When a user logs into the application, the authentication process 
will not only establish the role in which the user wishes to operate but also identify the user 
as an individual.  Information relating to the individual as well as the role in which they 
were acting must be recorded along with the security sensitive operations which they 
performed.  Hence the credential passed to the SDOs must not only include role information 
for the authorization process but also the identity of the user to permit the writing of the 
audit entry.  A separate policy will be used to determine which of the SDO operations 
require logging. 
As already noted, a security aware application should only be run on a trusted platform.  
Given the need for a trusted OS, an application based on the SDO concept will require a 
mechanism by which SDOs are able to determine the trust worthiness of its operating 
environment.  Some form of credential exchange between the application and the OS will be 
required to establish this trust.  The “trusted platform concept” of the trusted computer 
platform alliance (TCPA, 2000) could potentially provide such a mechanism by which that 
trust can be established.  On the basis of the established security of its environment, the 
SDOs will conduct an informed risk assessment of operating safely in that environment and 
tailor its behaviour accordingly.  Should the environment be judged to be sufficiently 
insecure the SDOs might refuse to operate for fear of compromising their sensitive data or 
functionality.  In extreme cases, the objects might even self-destruct after destroying 
persistent copies of their data. 
FUTURE WORK 
Immediate future work will involve the reporting on the lessons learned through the 
development of a number of security aware applications based on the SDO concept and 
written in Java.   
A number of other research questions will be explored as part of this research project 
including: 
•         Is the SDO concept scalable to large systems? 
•         Can quality security aware applications be constructed using software component 
technology?  If so, how can the SDO concept be extended to produce self defending 
components (SDCs) and how can SDCs be made aware of their security 
environment? 
•         Can improvements in the security, such as those which might result from the use of 
the SDO concept, be quantified? 
•         Can the SDO concept can be used in distributed systems? 
-          how can the secure distribution of an up to date policy be achieved? 
-          how will a migrated SDO become aware of its operating environment and 
respond accordingly? 
As described, later research will focus on the usefulness of the SDO concept in enhancing 
the security of a web services server. 
SUMMARY 
In this paper, we initially identified the need for a change in the object oriented 
programming paradigm to simplify the development of security aware applications.  The 
concept of self defending objects was introduced as a way of fulfilling that need and related 
to other research being carried out in computer security.  We then presented a high level 
overview of how the proposed self defending object paradigm might be used by application 
developers to provide assurance in the development of trustworthy security aware 
applications.   
The incorporation of the self defending object does not require a dramatic change in the way 
in which security aware applications are written.  However, we believe that by making 
software objects responsible for the protection of encapsulated security sensitive data and 
functionality, will significantly simplify the writing of security aware applications, thus 
enhancing information systems security. 
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